El arte de las autocreencias. Una aproximación boudoniana a la identidad social by Aguiar, Fernando
ISSN 2013-9004 (digital); ISSN 0210-2862 (paper)  Papers 2014, 99/4
http://dx.doi.org/10.5565/rev/papers.2080  579-593
The art of self-beliefs. 







In spite of recognizing that the concept of beliefs is a basic ingredient of our identity, 
Raymond Boudon neither developed a belief-based theory of social identity nor paid spe-
cial attention to the concept. This article will attempt to shed some light on why Boudon 
excluded identity from his work and inquire if his social theory can be used to address the 
issue. We suggest that it is possible to build the concept of identity on Boudon’s model of 
action by defining identity as a special kind of belief – a belief about oneself or self-belief.
Keywords: cognitive rationality; identity beliefs; homo economicus; homo sociologicus; Ray-
mond Boudon.
Resumen. El arte de las autocreencias. Una aproximación boudoniana a la identidad social
A pesar de que Raymond Boudon reconoce que el concepto de creencia es uno de los ingre-
dientes básicos de nuestra identidad, no desarrolló una teoría de la identidad social basada 
en las creencias ni prestó especial atención al concepto. En este artículo se intentará arrojar 
luz sobre los motivos por los que Boudon excluyó de su obra la identidad y se analizará si 
su teoría social se puede emplear para abordar el asunto. Lo que proponemos es que cabe la 
posibilidad de construir el concepto de identidad apoyándose en el modelo boudoniano de 
acción, lo que lleva a definir la identidad como una clase especial de creencia: una creencia 
sobre uno mismo o autocreencia.
Palabras clave: racionalidad cognitiva; creencias de identidad; homo economicus; homo socio-
logicus; Raymond Boudon.
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1. Introduction
The fertile work of Raymond Boudon spans the most diverse fields of soci-
ology, from his empirical work on unequal opportunities to his theoretical 
work on the nature of social action. Following in the footsteps of the great 
classics such as Tocqueville, Marx, Weber, and Pareto – whose works he knew 
well – there are few sociological issues that Boudon did not address. There is, 
however, one exception: social identity. It is not that Boudon did not dedicate 
any of his work to this topic (there was no need for him to do so), but the 
term hardly appears in his most important works, which is surprising given 
its importance. For example, the concept of social identity is not dealt with in 
the analytical indexes of Theories of Social Change (1986), The Analysis of Ideol-
ogy (1989), The Art of Self-Persuasion (1994) or The Origin of Values  (2000) 
nor can it be found in most of his articles or in the Dictionnaire critique de la 
sociologie (1982, 2004, written with Françoise Bourricaud). 
Not surprisingly, the issue of social identity is also absent in those works 
that analyze Boudon’s contribution. For instance, in her interesting book, 
Cynthia Lins Hamlin (2002) does not discuss social identity and in the monu-
mental tribute to Boudon edited by Mohamed Cherkaoui and Peter Hamilton 
(2009), comprising four volumes, only the chapter by Max Haller explores 
identity, but in a way that has nothing to do with Boudon’s work. 
Why did the author of The Analysis of Ideology ignore the issue of social 
identity despite it being central to sociology? What are the reasons for this 
decision? This article will attempt to shed some light on why Boudon excluded 
this key concept from his work and inquire if his theoretical approach can be 
used to address the issue of social identity that he chose to overlook. To this 
end, the following section will present some of the criticisms of the often vague 
and confusing concept of identity, as well as two attempts to overcome these 
criticisms – a sociological approach influenced by interactionist theory and the 
rational-choice reductionist project. After presenting Boudon’s model of social 
action in the third section, we will try to understand why he did not address the 
question of identity. In the fourth section we make a proposal for what could be 
a Boudonian approach to identity. Falling back on our previous work (Aguiar 
and de Francisco, 2009) we defend that social identity is a set of positive and 
normative collective beliefs individuals have about themselves; beliefs that give 
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social actors reasons for action. As we are going to see, Boudon’s social theory 
and his anti-Humean theory of action fit well in with this belief-based concep-
tion of identity (section five). Conclusions are drawn in the final section.
2. Homo sociologicus, homo economicus and identity
The literature on social identity is simply overwhelming. The topic of identity, 
which became “one of the unifying frameworks of the intellectual debate of the 
nineties” (Jenkins, 1996: 7), has not decreased in importance in the twenty-
first century. However, when delving further into the literature we soon come 
up against numerous conceptual obstacles. To begin with, we must tackle the 
enormous amount of adjectives that accompany the noun identity (personal, 
sexual, racial, ethnic, political, civic, cultural, social, collective, national, reli-
gious, local, and so on) (Somers and Gibson, 1994: 66). To the best of my 
knowledge, no other relevant category in the social sciences, perhaps with the 
exception of role, is bedecked with such a long cloak of adjectives. Take, for 
example, the habitual use of categories such as class, status, power, capital, 
group, action, structure, authority or organization. It seems as if the seman-
tic content of the concept of identity were plunged into obscurity and light 
can only be shed upon it by resorting to other concepts that serve to define 
it. Starting from this conceptual inflation, the main criticisms regarding the 
concept of social identity have been grouped into three categories (Brubaker 
and Cooper, 2000; Davis, 2006).
a) Conceptual ambiguity
The meanings of “identity” abound in the sociological, political science and 
psychological literature. Identity can be understand as people’s concept of who 
they are and how they relate to others; biological aspects grounded in a socially 
constructed meaning of identity (race, gender); identification with national, 
cultural or linguistic symbols; role-specific understanding and expectations 
about self; cognitive schemata by which the individual knows the world; the 
prescriptive representation of political actors; expressivist behavior or non-
instrumental modes of action; or the unstable, multiple and fragmented con-
temporary self, among others (Giddens, 1991). These myriad definitions pose 
reasonable doubts as to the usefulness of a concept which is at best vague and 
encompasses multiple definitions, as well as the causal tie between identity and 
action (MacInnes, 2004).
b) Categories of practice vs. categories of analysis
It is often difficult to distinguish if identity refers to the way in which people 
understand or see themselves in everyday life and in their social, political or 
economic practice, or if identity refers to an analytical concept embedded in a 
theory of social action. In other words, identity is not distinguished so much 
as a category of social practice but rather as a category of analysis (Brubaker 
and Cooper, 2000: 4). 
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c) Social identity does not exhaust personal identity
When identity is defined as a process of social identification, people are con-
sidered to be “embodiments of group prototypes rather than as independent 
individuals” (Davis, 2006: 6). Personal identity thus vanishes in a hyper-
socialized conception of the individual. But given the notably widespread 
consensus that people have multiple identities, it is necessary to appeal to 
individual or personal identity as a reference for the individual who reflex-
ively chooses what he or she wants to be. That is, if social identity involves 
fitting individual action to a social category that others attribute to us, 
personal identity would imply fitting the action to the image that one has 
or wishes to have about oneself. This is a complex process full of ambigui-
ties and incoherencies that can affect identification with others. For this 
reason, “without some account of the ‘bearer’ of a set of social identities, 
saying that an individual identifies with others is largely an empty claim” 
(Davis, 2006: 9). 
The criticisms of hypersocialized versions of identity have, however, been 
a catalyst for the development of new theories that try to strike a balance 
between elements that are the product of social context, those that are a prod-
uct of interaction, and those that are irreducibly personal. In what follows, we 
will see two prominent examples in this regard, which will be useful later to 
approach identity in Boudonian terms.
2.1. Homo sociologicus and identity
Luis is a 35-year-old black male, the father of one child, tall, married, a mem-
ber of a football club, Spanish, a trade unionist, a high school teacher, of 
Guinean descent, an anti-bullfighting activist, a fervent defender of gender 
equality and outgoing. Some of Luis’ traits are biological, others are social; 
some are a product of chance, others of need; some are the result of deliberate 
decisions, others of the consequences (foreseen or not) of those decisions; and 
yet others are culturally determined. Surely all these traits do not encompass 
all of what Luis is; but we can say that Luis is, at least, all that. In reality, any 
subset of traits that we might select would accurately identify Luis to a greater 
or lesser degree, although none would encompass all his properties. It should 
go without saying that what interests us here are Luis’ socially shared traits; 
those that shape his social identity.
However, Luis’ identity would not permit us to affirm, for example, that 
he takes part in a pro human rights movement because he is black, or that he 
participates in a demonstration on May 1st because he is a trade unionist, or 
that he defends his homeland because he is Spanish. In fact, there are many 
black people who do not participate in anti-racism movements, many Span-
iards who are not willing to defend their homeland, and many trade unionists 
that go for a picnic on the 1st of May. Hence, it appears that something more 
must be added to these identifying traits in order to explain Luis’ social action, 
either as an individual or as a member of a group.
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Indeed, this “something more” is composed of three elements whose pur-
pose is to integrate individual and social aspects in a general conception of 
identity. What we call “self” is a complex mixture of individual and social 
elements in which we must first distinguish the self-concept: “In general, the 
self-concept is the set of meanings we hold for ourselves when we look at our-
selves” (Stets and Burke, 2003: 130). This set of meanings is constructed by 
observing ourselves, through inferences about ourselves, the behavior of others 
towards us, and our desires. Part of what we call “self”, then, emerges through 
a process of evaluative self-reflection (Mead’s “looking-glass self”). 
The self-concept, however, is not a passive aspect of people, but is instead 
subject to self-assessment, the second component of “self”. Self-assessment has 
received much attention in recent years (Cast and Burke, 2002). It is under-
stood as self-esteem in a twofold manner as being competent and able (efficacy-
based self-esteem) and feeling valued and accepted (worth-based self-esteem). 
Finally, social identity is the third element of a “self” understood as a syn-
thesis of individual and social aspects. Identity is the organization of that “self” 
into “multiple parts (identities), each of which is tied to aspects of the social 
structures” (Stets and Burke, 2003: 132). What does it mean, for example, to 
be a parent, a trade unionist, a colleague or friend? From the perspective of 
agency, it is, firstly, the ability of people to give content (meaning) to these 
roles of parent, trade unionist, colleague or friend. Social roles are not cast in 
molds, but provide a margin of freedom: social agents can interpret and imple-
ment them in different ways. This, in turn, implies the possibility of creating 
new roles, as in the case, for example, of what is known as “new masculinities”, 
that is, new ways of interpreting the social role of “man” – men’s engagement 
in active fatherhood, masculinities embodied in managerial practices, and so 
on (Anderson, 2009).
From a structural perspective, adopting roles means we are governed by 
certain norms and rules, since ability to recreate social roles does not mean that 
we should act with our children as a trade unionist or with union members as 
a parent. Thus, the answer to the question of what roles mean (both in their 
agential and structural aspects) is the “content of identities” (Stets and Burke, 
2003).
The expression of the social “self” through social roles that acquire their 
meaning through interaction and contribute to the development of a reflective 
self-concept is therefore far from the old idea of a rigid, hypersocialized homo 
sociologicus. Our individual Luis, for example, holds egalitarian beliefs about 
what it means to be a father or a husband, and these beliefs are shared with 
other parents and husbands, but not all of them. To put it another way, Luis 
plays the role of father/husband on egalitarian terms. Moreover, very complex 
elements have intervened in his self-esteem, such as his profession or the fact 
that his parents were Guinean immigrants. These elements mean that Luis 
is embedded in a system of roles whose meanings provide him an identity 
that far from being rigid can be interpreted in strategic and normative terms, 
among others. 
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So, is social identity from this perspective a category of analysis or a cat-
egory of practice? It is both because identities are not only attributed to indi-
viduals in the form of labels, but the categorization is related to the meaning 
the roles have for the individuals themselves (Turner, 1999).
2.2. Homo economicus and identity 
The most orthodox rational choice has always ignored the question of social 
identity. For the classical model of rational choice theory, the goal of individu-
als is to maximize their welfare or utility given their beliefs and preferences. 
Beliefs are rational if they are based on all the available information. In turn, 
preferences are rational when they are logically consistent, that is, if they do 
not contradict each other, if one thing and its opposite are not preferred at the 
same time, if they are transitive, complete, etc. Under these conditions, it can 
be assumed that individuals always act as if they would try to maximize their 
interest, and that is the only reason needed to explain social action.
According to this approach, theories of social identity are said to need-
lessly multiply the reasons for action, that is, they are not parsimonious. 
The best thing therefore is to adopt a reductionist strategy concerning social 
identity. In its more orthodox versions of rational choice, that strategy has 
been radical because it assumes that speaking about identity is equivalent to 
speaking about the specific interests of a person or a group of people who 
attempt to maximize their utility. It doesn’t matter that Luis is a Spaniard of 
Guinean origin and a trade unionist; what essentially matters are the prefer-
ences he reveals through the action and not a supposedly objective identity 
(Hardin, 1995: 7).
A second, strategy, which is less orthodox and radical, also holds that iden-
tity is reducible to interest, but not only instrumental interest, as there are 
also expressive interests. According to Morris Fiorina, for example, “expressive 
factors probably dominate instrumental factors as an explanation of turnout” 
(1976: 410). What is at issue, then, is to consider the expression of identity 
– what one is – as another argument of the utility function (Akerlof and 
Kranton, 2010). For instance, we do not vote for one or another party just to 
maximize our self-interest, but to express our political identity, as the cost of 
voting is greater than the benefit to be gained. To continue with our exam-
ple, Luis does not vote for the Socialist Party because it will benefit him, but 
because he is a socialist. Hence, we must include among Luis’ preferences the 
fact that what he wishes to express is his identity. Only then can the fact that 
he votes be explained (Schuessler, 2000).
Without the conceptual richness of the interactionist-based sociological 
perspective, rational choice has managed to include identity in its research 
program (Calvert, 2000), and although it may have become less parsimonious, 
it is now more realistic. Both currents, that of sociological tradition and that of 
economic tradition, have left behind the old evils of the structural-functionalist 
concept of identity (conceptual ambiguity, the quasi-objective conception of 
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identity, hypersocialization, and so on). Let us now see if we are capable of 
understanding why Boudon did not partake in this revival.
3. Boudon’s theory of social action and the identity oblivion
Boudon’s theory of action may provide us with some clues to understand, 
firstly, why the French sociologist almost entirely ignored social identity in 
his work, although it has remained one of the key issues in the social sciences, 
as we have just seen. Furthermore, this will allow us to ask which conception 
of identity follows from his theory. Although the answer to these questions is 
speculative, since Boudon himself never raised these issues systematically, it 
is worth inquiring into them as they shed light on his theoretical position as 
well as the concept of identity.
As is known, for Boudon a social phenomenon M is the aggregate product 
of a set of actions m taking place in the situation S (Boudon, 1989):
M = M {m [S (P)]}
Let us look at each of the elements of this equation, which we will sub-
sequently tie in with social identity. The phenomenon M we are interested 
in is the result of actions –explained in terms of attitudes and beliefs – of a 
set of individuals m. Following in the Weberian tradition, Boudon denied 
the explanatory value of collective concepts, which he instead understood 
as the result of individual interaction. For example, we cannot say that the 
Protestant ethic – to once again use this classic example – is responsible for 
the rise of capitalism without explaining the actions, attitudes and beliefs 
(interaction in short) of Protestants. In other words, the phenomenon M 
is a function of or a variable that depends on the set of individuals that are 
responsible for the phenomenon, that is, M=M(mi, mj), where the subscripts 
denote the categories to which these individuals belong. To avoid being 
accused of inconsistent social atomism, Boudon ignored individuals “who 
are responsible for M in their concrete individuality, but we shall classify 
them in general categories” (Boudon, 1989: 243); categories that may have 
to do with the sex, gender or social roles of individuals. That is important to 
understand that the type of methodological individualism Boudon defended 
is close to what has been termed structural individualism (Hedström and 
Bearman, 2009: Chapter 1; Boudon and Fillieule, 2004). Indeed, the inter-
action of a set of individuals m gives rise to the phenomenon M in a given 
situation S that allows these individuals to be categorized. On the one hand, 
explaining or understanding (verstehen) a social phenomenon implies under-
standing the logic of the situation S, which is determined by a structural 
factor P –the labor market, for instance, or a set of social norms. On the 
other hand, however, it is important to examine individual attitudes and 
beliefs as understood by the social actors themselves involved in the structural 
situation S(P).
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In this way, Boudon avoided what in his opinion were two of the evils of 
sociology: structuralist hyperfunctionalism and the rationalism of the homo 
economicus (Boudon, 2006; Lins Hamlin 2002: 12). In the first case, the social 
actor disappears under the weight of omnipresent and omnipotent objective 
structures that leave no room for explaining action in terms of intentions. In 
the second case, the social structure loses its importance to the sovereign action 
of rational utility-maximizing individuals. In contrast to the rationalism of 
rational choice, Boudon defended a Simonian model of subjective rationality 
(cognitive rationality) (Boudon, 1994; Boudon and Viale, 2000) in which 
people are not assumed to act as if they were rational and selfish, but that they 
have and give good, satisficing subjective reasons for behaving the way they 
do (Boudon, 1994, 2001, 2006). 
This brief summary of Boudon’s model will help us understand the 
feasible reasons why the French author ignored the concept of identity 
and how we can rescue it using his model. First, Boudon explicitly rejected 
identity as an essentialist theoretical concept that is a product of a hyper-
socialized conception of social actors. Thus conceived, people would have 
rigid identities that would determine their social behavior, which in turn 
would prevent them from interpreting their action on their own terms, that 
is, sticking to their own reasons. Identity would therefore be a structural 
concept that corsets action completely. Consider, for example, the concept 
of role. The role identity as a parent or high school teacher of our charac-
ter, Luis, does not explain his action in a corseted way. Rather, as Boudon 
pointed out, individuals interact within systems of roles that do not over-
ride their intentionality, because they retain their ability to make decisions 
(Boudon, 1981). The beliefs and preferences of individuals are influenced 
by the role they play (the logic of the situation), but they do not define 
closed and absolute identities.
Let us think about cultural identity. Luis is a Spaniard of Guinean origin. 
What is his supposed cultural identity? What values have more weight when 
defining his social “self”, those that his parents gave him or those of the coun-
try of his birth? The fact that Luis is Spanish does not mean that he has a set of 
values  that cannot be judged, evaluated, compared and even rejected without 
Luis ceasing to be who he is. Cultural identity does not “lock” Luis into a set 
of incommensurable community values :
“Les notions indéfiniment déclinées aujourd’hui d’«identité culturelle» ou de 
«cultural embeddedness», qui invitent à voir les sociétés comme communautés 
ou des réseaux de «communautés» assises sur des systèmes de valeurs incom-
mensurables, tendent à écarter par principe toute possibilité d’appréciation 
par l’observateur extérieur des pratiques ou des institutions en vigueur ici 
ou là. Pourtant, nous sentons bien que nous avons un droit à en juger. De 
façon générale, l’interprétation «postmoderniste» des valeurs apparaît comme 
en contradiction avec une multitude de faits facilement observables”. (Boudon, 
2000: 2). 
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The essentialism of postmodern cultural identity prevents the outside 
observer from understanding why individuals act, which leads to relativism 
and violates the neo-Weberian postulate of explanation as understanding: the 
individual who does not belong to a culture or social category, it is said, can-
not understand and therefore cannot explain the social action of members of 
that culture or category.
Thus, rather than the closed and incommensurable identity of the hyper-
socialized homo sociologicus (functionalist or postmodern), Boudon is closer 
to the reductionist strategy of orthodox rational choice, which is perhaps one 
of the reasons why he ignored the concept of identity. However, Boudon’s 
reductionism was very different from that of rational choice. We have seen 
that the most orthodox rational choice rejects the explanatory utility of the 
concept of identity and reduces it to individual interests. Boudon, however, 
would be unable to accept this rationalist reductionism. He could not accept 
that identity is one more argument in utility functions. This would turn all 
individuals into irrational seekers of the best expression of their “best” self, 
just as an employer would try to maximize her profit or a party would try to 
maximize its number of votes. Arguably, then, Boudon’s reductionism has 
nothing to do with rational choice.
The fact that Boudon did not pay as much attention to identity as to other 
key issues of sociology therefore has to do, on the one hand, with his outright 
rejection of functionalism and structuralism and their postmodern heirs. On 
the other hand, he could not be convinced of reducing the concept as rational 
choice theory does because it meant not rejecting the rationalist model of the 
utility-maximizing homo economicus. This gives us good reason to think that 
maybe for him the concept was useless.
However, we think it is not useless. In fact, what we think is that Boudon 
did not pay attention to the identity revival because his criticism focused on 
the orthodox versions of functionalism/postmodernism and rational choice, 
as we have just seen. Had he been interested in those sociological and eco-
nomic identity theories that tried to overcome orthodox approaches, he 
might have developed his own theory. Unfortunately, he did not do that 
in spite of remaining alert to the evolution of sociological theory – but not 
regarding identity. 
In the next section, then, we are going to tentatively see if his formula could 
permit us to find a way of interpreting identity in Boudonian terms. 
4. The possibility of a Boudonian approach to social identity 
Social identity can be the dependent variable to be explained or the independ-
ent variable which helps to explain other phenomena. In the first case, when 
the social phenomenon to be explained is identity, I (identity) would be equal 
to M:
I = M = M {m [S (P)]}
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Or what is the same,
I = I {m [S (P)]}
Social identity is explained through the actions m of a set of individuals 
in a situation S: the social action of individuals is what explains their collec-
tive identity. This would be the case, for example, of rites of passage, where 
a series of actions must be performed in order to be admitted to the group to 
which we want to belong. Here the intentionality of the action is unquestion-
able: people seek an identity because they want that identity. This version of 
Boudon’s formula has to do, then, with the agential aspect of identity, that is, 
the aspect in which individuals make or create their own role (identity role). 
Let us consider again the case of Luis. Since we are not interested in his con-
crete individuality but the degree to which he belongs to a general category, we 
must explain (understand) his actions, which together with the actions of other 
individuals, shape his social identity. As a trade unionist and school teacher, 
Luis has a set of positive beliefs about his profession. Luis believes, for example, 
that teachers earn a low salary, work long hours, lack the means to improve the 
quality of education and that their profession is not valued highly by society. 
These beliefs may be true or false, but Luis has good reason to take them into 
account given the information available to him, the opinion of his peers, his 
assessment of the professional career of his friends who are not teachers, etc.
In addition to positive beliefs, Luis has normative beliefs about what is 
just and what is unjust, what is right and what is wrong in the world of work, 
what is fair and what is not. Positive and normative beliefs, which are not the 
product of a simple cost-benefit analysis, are of a “trans-subjective” nature 
(Boudon, 2001: 123), as Luis believes that his reasons are well grounded and 
he can therefore share them with others. This allows us to say that Luis does 
X (go on strike, for example) because he believes that Y is true, fair, good, and 
so on (Boudon, 1994: 255). 
What then would be the identity, the “I” in the above formula? In the reduc-
tionist program we have ascribed to Boudon, beliefs are sufficient to explain 
social action and identity would therefore be a redundant concept. However, 
we are not forcing Boudon’s model if we add, on an expressivist base, that social 
action is understood insofar as it reveals or expresses the positive and norma-
tive beliefs of social actors, both about the world and themselves.1 When Luis 
1. Boudon’s use of “belief” is not always clear, but we think it is implicitly close to that of the 
analytical philosophy of mind: “Analytic philosophers of mind generally use the term ‘belief’ 
to refer to the attitude we have, roughly, whenever we take something to be the case or 
regard it as true. To believe something, in this sense, needn’t involve actively reflecting on 
it […] Nor does the term “belief”, in standard philosophical usage, imply any uncertainty 
or any extended reflection about the matter in question (as it sometimes does in ordinary 
English usage). Many of the things we believe, in the relevant sense, are quite mundane” 
(Schwitzgebel, 2014). On the contrary, normative beliefs cannot be true or false. But both 
are mental states (Elster, 2007: Ch. 7). 
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performs action X, he is expressing what he is, he is expressing his social iden-
tity: a trade unionist and teacher in our example. Harboring the positive belief 
that situation X is true (“school teachers are paid little”) and unfair (“it’s not 
fair that some school teachers are paid so little”) and acting in accordance with 
those beliefs involves developing a positive belief about oneself as a fair person: I 
(think that I) am a fair person. The notion then that identity is a set of positive 
and normative beliefs about ourselves that give us good reasons to act can be 
supported in Boudon’s model. The set of actions (mi, mj), based on the positive 
and normative beliefs X, Y, and Z, give rise to a collective identity I.
This interpretation of Boudon’s formula in terms of social identity, which 
he did not do but can be deduced from his model of social action without 
forcing it, allows us to address the other side of the matter, namely, those situ-
ations in which identity is the independent variable:
M = M {i [S (P)]}
Here it is not a question of explaining how identity is formed from a set of 
actions m, but understanding how certain aggregate phenomena M occur (go 
on strike, make war, vote, make family decisions, etc.) from the expression of 
identity i, which is given. Once identity is understood as a set of positive and 
normative beliefs, the most varied of social phenomena can be explained. Thus, 
for example, the joint action of Catholics who, with good subjective reasons, 
believe in God and believe that they should go to church and go because they 
think they are the type of people who fulfill their religious duties make the 
Church stronger. 
This tentative Boudonian approach to identity seems to lack the defects 
that the French author attributed to hypersocialized theories or rational 
choice. It is neither a deterministic approach that establishes direct causal 
links between identity and action without attending to the microfoundations 
of identity, nor an empty maximizing exercise. On the contrary, social identity 
is a set of collective beliefs (positive and normative) individuals have about 
themselves; beliefs that give social actors reasons for action (Aguiar and de 
Francisco, 2009).
5. Boudon’s anti-Humean theory of action
We have seen that the identity of the homo sociologicus is complex. It is shaped 
by the social roles of a “self” that conceives itself through its own observation 
and that of others, and well as its desires, beliefs and self-assessment. The 
most recent theories of identity do not rely on the classical homo sociologicus of 
functionalism or the orthodox homo economicus of rational choice. What is the 
point then of reducing this complex identity to mere beliefs? Beliefs are a part 
of the self-concept, but not the only one; desires should also be a prominent 
part of identity. However, does not a theory that focuses on beliefs impoverish 
the concept of identity?
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As Cynthia Lins Hamlin points out, Boudon’s theory of cognitive rational-
ity is not only a theory of action, but “a theory of beliefs (both positive and 
normative) which draws on the strong reasons that agents have for doing what 
they do or believing what they believe” (Lins Hamlin, 2002: 2-3). Or to put it 
another way, beliefs provide reasons for action and that is what helps explain 
the action from the perspective of the subjects themselves. Beliefs that are 
positive (which may be true or false) and normative always respond to situ-
ations of interaction: “they are instituted at the meeting point of a personal 
history, personal projects and the situation of the actor” (Boudon and Bour-
ricaud, 1986: 46). That meeting point could be seen as the social identity of 
an individual, and if the identity can explain action, we have to appeal to the 
beliefs that explain (permit understanding) that action. This does not mean 
that affective and volitional aspects are not important to understanding action; 
Boudon often stresses the importance of emotions and desires or preferences 
(Boudon, 2001). The implication is that even if they are sufficient, they are 
not necessary, unlike beliefs, which are necessary and often sufficient. Boudon’s 
theory is thus clearly anti-Humean: beliefs have their own motivational force 
and the action does not always need the desire-belief pair to be explained. If I 
have a beer in a pub, my action to pay for it is not explained by my desire to 
pay, but by the normative belief that I must pay (Searle, 2001). But the fact 
that the action does not always need the desire-belief pair to be explained does 
not mean that it never needs it. What is important here to understand Boudon 
is that these desires are often the dependent variable of an explanation in which 
beliefs are independent variables: “beliefs can play the role of independent 
variables, that is to say, they appear as cause rather than effect, not only in 
individual development but in social change” (Boudon and Bourricaud, 1986: 
46). Beliefs are, then, the cause of action and when the action relates to what 
a person believes he is or believes he should be these beliefs about one’s self or 
identity beliefs explain the action (I vote socialist because I am a socialist, for 
example).2 On the other hand, when identity beliefs are the dependent variable 
we have to explain their genesis based on “what we sometimes call, in rather a 
vague term, social structures” (Boudon and Bourricaud, 1986: 44). In any case, 
far from impoverishing the concept of identity, Boudon’s action theory allows 
us to reconstruct it on grounds that go beyond the Humean model inasmuch 
as he gives motivational force to beliefs. 
It is doubtful, however, that Boudon would support the interpretation 
of identity we have presented here. Given Boudon’s rejection of all forms of 
psychologism, he might well consider that the concept of identity involves 
an unnecessary psychologization of social beliefs. However, it is a path that 
is worth pursuing to at least overcome two of the problems of his theory of 
action. The first is the absence of a clear definition of “belief” throughout his 
2. Having the desire to vote socialist is explained by the fact of being socialist, not the other 
way round – I am not socialist because I desire to vote socialist. Being socialist is to share 
with other persons a set of beliefs about the world and about ourselves. 
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work. Although here we have implicitly assumed that beliefs are mental states 
(see footnote 2), this “mentalism” seems to be foreign to the French author’s 
work, although he sometimes succumbs to it. A Boudonian theory of identity 
beliefs would make it necessary to define the very concept of belief in more 
detail.
The second problem is that of the “danger of adhocness” (Manzo, 2012: 
39), which affects Boudon’s version of good, subjective reasons for action. 
Indeed, one can always resort to a subjective reason to understand social action 
(workers have good reason to accept exploitation, the members of tribe X have 
good reason to believe in magic, etc.), meaning that his theory runs the risk of 
being uninformative: there will always be ad hoc reasons to explain any action. 
However, the expression of identity can be one of the “human invariants” that 
allow defining the scope of subjective reasons for action. As Gianluca Manzo 
argues with regard to the work of Boudon, “the link among social belonging, 
social identity and actor´s beliefs…can help in building reason-based explana-
tions that lead to fine-grained predictions ex-ante facto” (Manzo, 2012: 45).3 
Identity gives us good reasons to act based mainly on positive and normative 
beliefs about ourselves. This also gives us good reason to think that perhaps 
Boudon would have accepted a Boudonian approach to identity.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we have tried to show that it is possible to draw a belief-based 
definition of social identity from Boudon’s theory of social action. We think 
this is an interesting speculative task to perform because the French sociologist 
did not address the issue. He did not give us many clues to understand the 
reason why he rejected one of the key sociological concepts. However, in a first 
speculative exercise it can be established that Boudon was not interested in the 
identity question due to the ambiguity of a concept either hypersocialized by 
orthodox functionalists and postmodernists or reduced to preference maxi-
mization by the orthodox rational choice theory. Rejecting both theoretical 
trends entailed rejecting identity as an analytically useful concept. However, 
why did Boudon not pay attention to the new developments coming from 
interactionists and heterodox rational choice theorists, among others? We can 
only conjecture that it may have had to do with the logic of Boudon´s situa-
tion: in France, the cradle of postmodern functionalism, Boudon felt the need 
to incessantly quarrel with postmodern thinkers. In fact, the only quotation 
on identity we have found is a criticism of postmodernism. 
The second speculative exercise has consisted in posing the following ques-
tion: Does Boudon’s social action formula permit us to address the identity 
issue? Of course it does. At the same time it helps us to understand some inter-
esting features of his work. First, we have seen that Boudon gives beliefs causal 
power: Beliefs are causes, not only effects, of social action. Inasmuch as beliefs 
3. Manzo, however, does not accept a belief-based definition of social identity (Manzo, 2012).
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have motivational force – give us reasons for action – we do not always need 
a desire to understand individual and social actions. In breaking the Humean 
belief-desire pair that way we can defend that Boudon´s theory is clearly anti-
Humean. Thus, it can be stated that a belief-based conception of identity fits 
in with his theory of action. 
Of course these two speculative exercises are not free from serious 
problems. On the one hand, there are hermeneutic problems, that is, 
problems of interpreting Boudon correctly. Taking into account, for 
instance, that his belief definition is far from clear, it can be contested 
that we are right in saying the French sociologist is an anti-Humean 
thinker that gives beliefs motivational force. On the other hand, there 
are theoretical problems. If we put aside interpretation matters, the very 
proposal of understanding identity as a set of beliefs about oneself can 
be still questioned. However, tentative works are not useless if they open 
new research paths. 
Bibliographic references
Aguiar, Fernando; de Francisco, Andrés (2009). “Rational choice, social identity 
and beliefs about one self”. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 39 (4), 547–571.
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0048393109333631
Akerlof, George; Kranton, Rachel (2010). Identity economics: How our identities 
shape our work, wages, and well-being. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Anderson, Eric (2009). Inclusive masculinity: The changing nature of masculinities. 
London: Routledge.
Boudon, Raymond (1981). La lógica de lo social. Introducción al análisis sociológico. 
Madrid: Rialp. 
— (1989). The analysis of ideology. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
— (1990). “Subjective rationality and the explanation of social behavior”. Rationality 
and Society, 2 (2), 224–228.
— (1994). The art of self-persuasion. Cambridge: Polity Press.
— (2000). “Pluralité culturelle et relativisme”. Comprendre, 1, 311–339.
— (2001). The origin of values. Sociology and philosophy of beliefs. London: Transaction 
Publishers.
— (2006). “Homo Sociologicus: Neither a rational nor an irrational idiot”. Papers, 80, 
149–169.
Boudon, Raymond; Bourricaud, Francoise. (1986). A critical dictionary of sociology. 
Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Boudon, Raymond; Viale, Riccardo (2000). “Reasons, cognition and society”. Mind 
and Society, 1, 45–56.
Boudon, Raymond; Fillieule, Renaud (2004). Le méthodes en sociologie. Paris: PUF.
Brubaker, Rogers; Cooper, Frederick (2000). “Beyond identity”. Theory and Society, 
29, 1–47. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1007068714468
Calvert, Richard (2000). “Rationality, identity and expression”. In: Ira Katznelson 
and Helen Milner (eds). Political Science: The State of the Discipline. New York: 
Norton. 
The art of the self-beliefs. A Boudonian approach to social identity Papers 2014, 99/4 593
Cast, Alice; Burke, Peter (2002). “A theory of self-esteem”. Social Forces 80, 1041–
1068. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/sof.2002.0003
Davis, John (2006). “Social identity strategies in recent economics”. Journal of Eco-
nomic Methodology, 13, 371–390. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501780600908168
Elster, Jon (2007). Explaining Social Behavior: More Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sci-
ences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511806421
Fiorina, Morris (1976). “The voting decision: Instrumental and expressive aspects”. 
Journal of Politics, 38, 390–413. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2129541
Giddens, Anthony (1991). Modernity and self-identity: Self and society in the late mod-
ern age. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Haller, Max (2009). “Language and identity in the age of globalization”. In: Cherka-
oui, Mohamed and Hamilton, Peter (eds). Raymond Boudon, a life in sociology. 
Essays in Honour of Raymond Boudon. Oxford: The Bardwell Press.
Hardin, Russell (1995). One for All. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Hedström, Peter; Bearman, Peter (2009). “What is analytical sociology all about? An 
introductory essay”. In: Hedström, Peter and Bearman, Peter (eds). The Oxford 
handbook of analytical sociology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jenkins, Richard (1996). Social Identity. London: Routledge.
Lins Hamlin, Cynthia (2002). Beyond relativism: Raymond Boudon, cognitive ration-
ality and critical realism. London: Routlege.
MacInnes, John (2004). “The sociology of identity: Social science or social com-
ment?”. British Journal of Sociology, 55, 531–543.
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-4446.2004.00036.x
Manzo, Gianluca. (2012). “Reason-based explanations and analytical sociology”. 
European Journal of Social Sciences 50 (2), 35–66.
Searle, John (2001). “Rationality and action”. In: Branquinho, João (ed). The foun-
dations of cognitive science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schuessler, Alexander (2000). “Expressive voting”. Rationality and Society, 12, 
87–119.
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/104346300012001005
Schwitzgebel, Eric (2014). “Belief”. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 
2014 Edition). Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
 http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/belief. Retrieved 3 June 2014.
Somers, Margaret; Gibson, Gloria (1994). “Reclaiming the epistemological ‘Other’: 
Narrative and the Social Constitution of Identity”. In: Calhoun, Craig (ed.). 
Social Theory and the Politics of Identity. Oxford: Blackwell.
Stest, Jan E.; Burke, Peter J. (2003). “A sociological approach to self and identity”. 
In: Leary, Mark R. and Tangney, June (eds.). Handbook of self and identity. New 
York: The Guilford Press.
Turner, J. C. (1999). “Some current issues in research on social identity and self-cat-
egorization theories”. In: Ellemers, Naomi; Spears, Russell and Doosje, Bertjan 
(eds). Social identity: Context, commitment, content. Oxford: Blackwell.
